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ABSTRACT 
This paper outlines characteristics of the diffusion of public-private partnership (PPP) 
and focuses attention on its use in Italy, especially in the healthcare sector. After more 
than a decade since its introduction, inspired by foreign experiences, the academic 
literature contribution to the debate and the empirical experiences have highlighted 
several gaps of the instrument with financial and managerial implications for the 
public sector. In particular, in Italy, with reference to the value for money, risks and 
accounting treatment, the initial uncertainty about appropriate measures for 
evaluating the projects, now, should lead to a more accurate reflection. Through a 
comparative analysis of two case studies - public hospitals -, the paper shows the 
most relevant areas in which it is a time for an urgent rethink of PPP utilization, as a 
lesson for the future. 
Keywords: public-private partnership, healthcare management, hospital 
infrastructure finance, value for money 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the evolution of the Italian NHS, particular attention has been paid to 
investments for the renovation of hospital infrastructures and the creation of new healthcare 
facilities. 
According to recent national health plans, hospital redevelopment – expansion, 
modernization, reconversion of small size hospitals –  as well as the construction of other 
types of healthcare facilities require substantial consideration. In order to implement this 
renovation process, the government has been encouraging the regional authorities, who are 
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responsible for the local healthcare services, to practice the special plan for investments,  
which is historically hard to manage and does not always have the capacity to respond to real 
financial needs. Further, taking into account the global financial crisis, a matter of 
considerable concern  relates to the search for new solutions to access financial resources 
without negatively affecting public debt. For that reason, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
have once again come to the forefront , following the recommendations contained in the 
Communication of the European Union (COM 615, 2009) Mobilising private and public 
investment for recovery and long term structural change: developing Public Private Partnerships, 
claiming (p.2): “Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) can provide effective ways to deliver 
infrastructure projects, to provide public services and to innovate more widely in the context 
of these recovery efforts”. 
After its debut in the early 2000s in Italy, Project Financing (PF) has been the best-known 
formula identifying  the public-private partnership (PPP), as in many other countries 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999; Froud and Shaoul, 2001; Akintoye et al., 2002; Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2002, 2004; Broadbent et al., 2003). In the light of the literature debate, the most 
frequent issue concerns whether the support given to PF  is still acceptable, according to an 
optimism bias (MacDonald, 2002), “as a measure of the over optimism in project estimates” 
(Broadbent et.al., 2008), or whether any additional precautions should be taken so that the 
PPP model can be virtuous enough to create effective advantages and social benefits. The 
achievement of value for money (VFM), the testing of a long-term affordability and the risk 
transfer continue to be the cause of the serious concerns that have so far accompanied PPP 
contracts (Broadbent et.al., 2008; Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008;  English et al., 2010). As 
observed in the experiences carried out in other countries (mainly Australia and the UK), the 
frequently-asked question is whether such investment strategies are the result of an 
opportunistic approach rather than of a rational choice. This has unavoidably pushed 
academics and scholars to explore “the underlying nature and rationale for PPPs; processes 
and procedures aiding decisions to undertake PPPs; processes and procedures for ex-post 
evaluations of PPPs; the merit and worth of PPPs; PPPs regulation and guidance” (Andon, 
2012: 878). In the last decade, several articles have offered research findings and reflections on 
these topics (see, for example, Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999, 2002, 2003; Froid, 2003; 
Edwards and Shaoul, 2003; English and Guthrie, 2003; English and Skellern, 2005).  
In particular,  the paper aims to investigate two issues : 1) whether hospital investments made 
by PF in Italy have a positive impact on the whole system in terms of social and economic 
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benefits; 2) how the PPP experiences of the “first wave” could be an effective guide for the 
future according to an accounting logic. As a matter of fact, it is a common conviction that PF 
is proving a financial drain for the healthcare sector, especially because some of these 
experiences are now in the operational phase. Inevitably, that should entail reconsideration of 
the key variables and their accounting relevance to make the choice of PPP more reliable. 
Section 2 examines PPPs in greater detail , inspired by theoretical approaches, at national and 
international level. Section 3 focuses on the PF features in the healthcare sector, its actual 
ability to represent a strategic alternative for the future and the critical variables to which the 
government must pay more attention. Section 4 illustrates a comparison of PF in two Italian 
hospitals, highlighting and discussing the most controversial issues of the contracts. Finally, 
some concluding reflections. 
 
THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF PPPs 
The New Public Management (NPM) reforms, through a redefinition of the boundaries between 
State and market, have encouraged the acceptance of a contractual approach to public service 
delivery (Hood, 1991, 1995; Lane, 2000; Osborne, 2000; Hebson et al.,2003). “A major 
implication of all of these reforms [has been] an increased emphasis on management rather 
than administration of services, with a concomitant shift in emphasis from the traditional 
stewardship role of accounting to cost management” (Jackson and Lapsley, 2003). PPPs have 
been coherently considered an “extension” of the NPM agenda for change (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2003) and  their introduction “has largely been evaluated through conceptual lenses 
that emphasise either the administrative, managerial, financial or technical dimensions of this 
reform strategy” (Flinders, 2005:215). The expression PPP is intensely “malleable as a form of 
privatization” and “despite its ambiguity, is sometimes a useful phrase because it avoids the 
inflammatory effect of “privatization” on those ideologically opposed” (Savas, 2005:1). As has 
been claimed, the PPP stresses “the use of contracts for the management of the risk”, thus 
representing the highest expression of the reforms due to NPM (Froud, 2003). In addition, the 
very concepts of accountability and transparency, as main elements of NPM, seem to have a 
direct effect on PPPs  (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008).  
In this context, the concept of cooperation between public and private sectors flourished to 
form an inter-organisational partnership, especially in those countries where the privatization 
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process has been actively undertaken (Pongsiri, 2002). PPPs were immediately perceived as a 
broad umbrella, which can safeguard the public interest while creating potential investment 
and adding value from the private sector (Carr, 1998; Pongsiri, 2002). That would corroborate 
a conceptual model based on the “mixed economy’’ with a sort of liberalisation policy in the 
way public services are produced and delivered. The idea that PPPs open up possibilities for 
public service delivery, deriving not only from organisations owned and controlled by the 
public sector, but also from both public and private sectors in partnership, is convincing 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; Flinders; 2005). In a certain sense, PPPs could be described as 
the result of a troubled search for new formulas to soothe the impact of public expenditure on 
national accounts but also to avoid the consequential complexity in the operational process of 
the public administration.  
 
A brief history  
In Europe, the origins of PPP (acting as PF) date back to 1979, when the UK Conservative 
government began the still-continuing shift of activities away from the public sector. Early 
financing proposals were mainly designed to evade the controls on public expenditure 
(Grahame, 2001).The actual Private Finance Initiative (PFI) program was announced in 1992, 
with the aim of achieving closer partnerships between the public and private sectors. This 
policy was introduced to increase the involvement of the private sector in the provision of 
public services (Grahame, 2001; Spackman, 2002; Pollock et al., 2002; Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2003). Some years later, with the Labour Government (1997), the program was proposed with 
a different label, but with its contents essentially unchanged. The objective was “to accelerate 
the process by which PPP contracts are agreed, in part by taking equity stakes in projects and 
in part by providing loans to public bodies” (Parker and Hartley, 2003). 
Even if the primacy remains in the UK, PPPs have spread to many other countries; and after a 
first phase of experimentation, in 2004, the European Commission issued the Green Paper on 
Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions  to launch “a 
debate on the application of Community law on public contracts and concessions to the PPP 
phenomenon”(Green Paper). The recent financial crisis led to a dramatic reduction in the 
capital value from almost EUR 30 Billion in 2007 to EUR 16 Billion in 2009 (EPEC, 2010). This 
poses a series of questions about the factors that are negatively influencing the use of PPPs 
and, once again, what obstacles have to be overcome in order to make the practice more 
reliable and viable (Connolly and Wall, 2013).  
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A PPP is usually a long-term contract between a public party and a consortium of private 
companies - referred to as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) - under which the private company 
is required to Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO) an infrastructure in return for 
payment for both the cost of construction and operation of the related services (Grimsey and 
Lewis 2004; Yescombe, 2007). The facility remains under public-sector ownership, or reverts 
from private partner to public-sector  ownership at the end of the PPP contract. Its economic 
relevance depends on the fact that:  
- cash flows generated by the operating process are the main guarantee and the source 
for covering the debt service;  
- implementation of the private initiative should be accompanied by an adequate level 
of project certainty and reliability deriving from a rigorous analysis and an 
indispensable risk adjustment; 
- sustainability of the initiative does not depend on the reliability of a company but 
concerns the quality of the single project (including the capacity to generate the cash 
flows with reference to a given level of risk);  
- the initiative takes advantage of a project autonomy – due to the constitution of an ad 
hoc company to safeguard the stakeholders’ interests;  
- the operational phase represents the critical success factor as only a management 
based on a high level of performance can contribute to generate the cash flows  that 
are indispensable to satisfy shareholder expectations; 
- the most significant guarantees connected with the initiative have a contractual 
nature rather than a real one (this is the so-called “without recourse operation”);  
- all the phases of the operation converge in a negotiation process, which has a  
variable duration and  is considered to be a decisive factor in the risk allocation 
between public and private partners. 
This partnership procedure cannot be explained just by the concession of  both the 
construction and the management of an infrastructure to a private partner because of the lack 
of financial resources but it must be based on an effective assessment of VFM, through the 
appraisal of the public sector comparator (PSC) (Gaffney and Pollock, 1999; Edwards and 
Shaoul, 2002). “A public sector comparator is a costing of a conventionally financed project 
delivering the same outputs as those of the PFI [PPP] deal under examination. It is just one of 
a number of ways of evaluating a proposed PFI deal. It is directly relevant only when the 
option publicly financed on which it is based is a genuine alternative to the PFI deal” (House 
of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, 2002, 9 June 2003). In that way, the possibility of 
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a traditional financing procedure must not be ruled out.  In the UK, the VFM methodology 
proposed by the government is based on an economic appraisal that compares costs and 
benefits of alternative investment decisions. It provides for two critical variables such as the 
method used to discount the future annual cash cost (in order to get the net present value) 
and risk transfer (Pollock et. al., 2002:1206). 
From the financial point of view, the PPP rationale turns round the conventional financing 
“from subject to object”, mainly by taking into account the intrinsic value of the project rather 
than the eligibility of a subject. Through the PF formula, the Public Administration entrusts a 
third party with the realization of public infrastructures and the management of its 
operational process. This approach can enable public organizations to undertake projects 
which they would be unable to finance conventionally, because of the lack of financial 
resources for the capital asset during its construction. It implies also a concrete change in the 
way the public sector intervenes in the economic field for public service delivery but, 
although responsibility for many elements of service delivery may be transferred to the 
private sector, the public sector remains responsible for (Torres and Pina 2001): 
- deciding on the level of services and resources to pay for them; 
- setting and monitoring safety, quality and performance standards for services;  
- enforcing those standards, taking appropriate action if they are not delivered.  
The public sector should benefit from the presence of the private party, above all in terms of 
reduction of the total financial commitment, investment promptness and, consequently, the 
timeline of service use. This implies that the convenience of the operation must be analysed 
under two different profiles. On the one hand, it would be advisable to verify the advantage 
for the Public Administration by taking into account VFM and, on the other hand, risk 
transfer. VFM is the key rationalising motive for partnership. As Edward and Shaoul (2002) 
assert, “its meaning in the context of PFI is no more precise and is similarly based upon the 
economy as reflected in the use of discounted cash flows over the lifetime of the project”. 
VFM depends on the “estimate of future costs and operates only at the point of 
procurement”. Many studies and reports have been carried out in the UK on this topic given 
that accountability depends on the detailed  recognition of VFM, by discharging 
accountability to the stakeholders, the lack of which in PPP has been persistently criticized 
(Demirag et al., 2005; Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008).  
Risk transfer and uncertainty seem to be the crucial elements under discussion since under 
PFI private sector borrowing, transaction costs and the requirements for profits necessarily 
generate higher costs than conventional public procurement (Broadbent, et al., 2008). Further, 
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many authors sustain that the PFI contract reduces the ability of the public sector to deal with 
uncertainty, given the long-term duration of the contract in which the public sector is locked 
(Froud, 2003; Lonsdale, 2005). It is, therefore, necessary to analyze what the principal 
vulnerabilities are that derive from risks (Broadbent et. al. 2008; EPEC, 2011). Traditional risks 
are identified as follows: demand and economic context; residual value; design; 
performance/availability; changes in relevant costs; obsolescence (ASB, 1998). Actual risks 
seem to be (Burger et al., 2009): the risk of an increase in the interest rate, leading to rising 
costs; liquidity problems and project feasibility considerations for private partners; the risk of 
credit being unavailable, leading to the termination of existing projects failing to reach the 
financial close.  
Most of the considerations on the costliness and convenience that the public sector can have 
in undertaking a PPP depend on the solution of problems related to risk. Several studies 
show that private cash can be more expensive than public finance since PF causes an increase 
in the annual cost. It is claimed that costliness could be acceptable since it should usually be 
balanced by the private sector taking on the risks of a project failure or default (EPEC, 2011).  
 
Accounting treatment and risks 
One of the acclaimed advantages of PFI/PPP is not only that infrastructure can be built 
without recourse to direct public-sector borrowing but that the assets (and associated 
liabilities) are deemed to be off-balance sheet for the public administration which 
commissions the PFI/PPP (Private Finance Panel, 1996; Froud, 2003). The accounting 
treatment of PPP falls under FRS 5, revised in 1998 by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) 
(ASB, 1998; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999). In deciding whether the owner of the asset is the 
public or the private sector, risk is central to any evaluation. This orientation has visibly 
influenced statements at the European level. 
In this regard, Eurostat established that the deficit and debt treatment should follow the 
requirements of the European System of Accounts (“ESA95”). For the purposes of recording 
PPPs, ESA95 requires national statisticians to look at the risk/reward balance in the 
underlying PPP arrangement. This balance is evaluated by analysing the allocation of two key 
risk categories between the public sector and the SPV, construction risk and market risk (i.e. 
availability and demand).The decision specifies the impact on government deficit/surplus and 
debt and it is in line with the European System of Accounts (ESA95), according to the opinion 
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of the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics (CMFB). 
Eurostat recommends that the assets involved in a PPP should be classified as non-
government assets, and, therefore, recorded off-balance sheet for government, if both of the 
following conditions are met: 
- the private partner bears the construction risk; 
- the private partner bears either the availability or the demand risk. 
If the government bears the construction risk, the PPP will always be on the government’s 
balance sheet, irrespective of the allocation of the demand and availability risks. If the private 
partner bears the construction risk, the PPP will be classified off the government’s balance 
sheet unless the government bears both demand and availability risks. 
The construction risk covers events related to the construction and completion of assets. In 
practice, it makes reference to events such as late delivery, non-compliance with specified 
standards, significant additional costs, technical deficiency and external negative effects 
(including environmental risk) which trigger compensation payments to third parties. The 
availability risk covers situations where, during the PPP operational phase, an 
underperformance linked to the state of the PPP assets results in services being partially or 
wholly unavailable, or services fail to meet the quality standards specified in the PPP 
contract. Finally, the demand risk refers to the variability of demand (higher or lower than 
expected when the PPP contract was signed), irrespective of the performance of the PPP 
company. A change in demand could be the consequence of factors such as the business 
cycle, new market trends, a change in final user preferences or technological obsolescence. 
The demand risk is part of the usual economic risk borne by private businesses in a market 
economy. 
At this critical time the view of the aforementioned risks is obviously an element of additional 
concern. In order to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact, EU Member states have 
considerable interest in promoting PPPs, but at the same time they have to ensure that the 
costs arising from investment in infrastructure be considered off-balance sheet. Given the 
importance of the national debt and deficit treatment of a PPP, this represents a decisive issue 
for the Public Sector (Connolly and Wall, 2011).  
 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPPs IN ITALY 
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In Italy, even though there have been no PFI programs, in the last decade some actions have 
been undertaken with the purpose of making rules more flexible in the context of public 
procurement and facilitating private participation in the realization of public infrastructures 
(most frequently by the DBFO formula). As  is clear from a study by the Bank of Italy, the 
projects funded are relatively small. In the period 2002-2008, the average amount of bids 
amounted to around  EUR 14.1 million and concerned the field of local public services with 
not very complex interventions. In the same period, the total value of the tenders increased 
from EUR 1.3 billion to  EUR 5.8 billion, their number from 184 to 411 (representing 1,7 % of 
the total number of tenders for public works and 17.6% in value term)(Giorgiantonio and  
Giovanniello, 2009). According to data collected by Finlombarda (2012), in 2011 there was a 
decline in PF, although the government has repeatedly encouraged  the use of the procedure. 
However, several obstacles seem to stand between the launch of initiatives and financial 
close, mainly due to the shortage of liquidity together with lengthy procedures and 
unpredictable times. The awards amounted to approximately EUR 6.6 billion a year, but in 
the last four years, the financial close  has stopped at EUR 1.8 billion.  
 
A regulamentary approach 
In the Italian system, the PPP has its normative point of reference in the model of the 
“concession”, with or without private initiative. The PPP is, in fact, regulated by law, as in 
other countries (Belgium, Poland, Spain, Portugal) even if it is widely known that a specific 
PPP law is not a necessary condition for PPP development. The legal framework can also be 
provided by changing existing legal provisions which may have an impact on the PPP project 
(EPEC, 2011). Through a concession, the public sector, interested in the realization of an 
infrastructure, allows a private subject a concession whose provisions include:  
- the duty, for the concessionaire, to construct the infrastructure through his own 
resources with a risk transfer to the private party;  
- the right to manage it for an extensive duration, in order to allow a satisfying return 
on investment;  
- the consequent ownership transfer to the public institution by the end of the 
concession.  
 
The PPP arrangements are based on a long-term contract and must have appropriate 
mechanisms in place to ensure that VFM is maintained for the duration of the partnership. 
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Since 1998, these rules have cleared up ambiguities regarding the utilization of projet financing 
as a financial instrument, by widening the range of application of the discipline and 
increasing the transparency of some norms relating to contracts, controls, guarantees and 
risks. Moreover, a few European countries have provided further regulation in this sector by 
setting up a specific taskforce at governmental level. Even if an explicit program has not been 
launched, such as the PFI/PPP in the UK, in 1999 the Italian Government created a centralised 
office, the Technical Unit for Project Financing (It. Unità Tecnica Finanza di Progetto, UTFP) to 
facilitate privately-financed infrastructures. This organization as a taskforce of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, has the aim of promoting the use of PPPs, also supporting the public 
administration at the regional and local level, for its implementation. After the uncertain 
debut of the implementation procedures and an unclear meaning attributed to the PPP, the 
UTFP outlined a stable framework tending to identify PPPs in three main subcategories:  
1. the granting of construction and operation; 
2. the granting of services; 
3. other residual formulas. 
Such a framework derives from the empirical analysis of the views of the PPP carried out by 
the National Observatory of PPP, sponsored by Union of Chambers of Commerce and the 
Chamber of Commerce of Rome with the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the UTFP. 
The construction of an infrastructure is the key element distinguishing the first model from 
the remaining categories. The first group includes bids involving the preliminary design, the 
definitive design, the executive design, the execution of a work and its management. The 
second group includes the tenders carried out with the procedures concerning the granting of 
public service management through existing structures. For this second procedure, the 
private concessionaire normally pays a license fee, although  government grants are not ruled 
out.  The third group includes various formulas, such as joint ventures for the operation of 
public services, district contracts,  and sponsorships. 
 
PPP in the Italian NHS 
As seen above, the typical PF features imply  some observations about its beneficial 
application in the Italian NHS, by considering an increasing need for buildings and 
modernization, above all with regard to hospitals (Amatucci and Vecchi, 2009). In the last 
decade, the hospital sector has appeared particularly interested in the use of PF, because of 
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the continuous evolution of technology and strategies implemented for a rationalization of 
health expenditure. The main factors behind the need for modernization are attributable to 
the following: 
- the gradual increase in the average age of the population (involving an increase in 
per capita expenditure); 
- innovation and advanced technologies; 
- the scientific and cultural progress of the population catalysing the demand for 
services in healthcare in terms of quality and quantity. 
In addition, there has been a gradual reduction in the number of ordinary admissions (acute 
patients) and a greater development of day hospital and day surgery care. More importance 
is given to the long-stay structures, where healthcare needs are to be considered with the 
request for comfort of the accommodation and the quality of the service. In general, according 
to the experience observed in the first wave (2000-2006) of PPPs, the method focused on a cost-
benefit evaluation for both the Local Healthcare Units (LHUs)  and users/patients, although this 
appraisal has led to large uncertainties. The PSC technique was never used in this first phase. 
Suffice it to say that it was only in 2008 that new, corrective legislation introduced the rule 
that in assessing the feasibility projects public authorities must draw up a real business plan to 
verify the economic and financial feasibility, the value creation and the sustainability of the 
initiative. VFM and PSC received a real impulse from the UTFP in a special document, in 2009 
(Martiniello and Zaino, 2009). 
In the Italian PPPs, the private partner usually takes on the responsibility for the management 
of the services mix regarding the functioning and maintenance of the structure and part of the 
core and non-core services. In particular, the system of services includes the following 
categories:  
- the facility management for buildings and supporting systems such as the thermic 
heating system, refrigerator system,  air conditioning, electrical equipment and 
plumbing, medical gas supply systems; 
- hotel services (catering for in-patients and staff, cleaning, disposal of waste material, 
reception, reservation centre, parking); 
- other services (stock management, hospital information systems, supply 
management, chemist, set-up of operating theatres, etc.). 
Initially, the Italian model of PPP in the healthcare sector was not supposed to modify the 
hospital management, which normally has recourse to outsourcing for building maintenance. 
It should have achieved through the management of the concession an administrative 
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simplification and an improvement in management, with consequent economies of scale. In 
the case of the PPP proposed in Italy, the only private aspect is the operation of the healthcare 
facility itself, not the provision of clinical care. Between 2002 and 2005 there was a 30.6% rise 
in the number of projects (27) and a 56.7% increase in spending (EUR 1,298 million). In value 
terms, 93% of the initiatives promoted involve the building or refurbishment of healthcare 
facilities, with non-medical support services (non-core) entrusted to the concessionaire. This 
proportion has remained unvaried over time. (Finlombarda, 2005; 2008; 2012).It is to be 
expected that LHUs will continue to control and monitor the impact of quality on 
users/patients.   
The composition of the price for the economic exploitation of the concession consists of an 
annual fee and a tariff. The annual fee is paid by the LHUs when a new structure starts to run 
(from the service availability date). This consists of two components, fixed and/or variable, 
and has to cover the services management, the facility management and the assistance to the 
medical structure. The private partner is thus allowed to have a return on investment. The fee 
is determined and paid according to different criteria.  
The tariff relates to the operating costs of both commercial spaces and services. The payment 
consists of revenues deriving from the lease or direct management of the adjacent commercial 
areas. Such a payment concerns the volume and typology of activities regarding the structure 
itself and is a function of the management system defined and/or contracted, from time to 
time, between the SPV and the LHU. For this revenue, the commercial risk is borne by the 
SPV. It is, however, clear that the main risk concerns demand. This means that any 
compensation arising from the operations of additional services partially affects the risk 
simulations contained in the business plan. 
These two heterogeneous components justify the potential application of the PF in the Italian 
healthcare sector and in the specific case of the hospitals make it possible even in the presence 
of a public payment (subsidies). Hospitals appeared initially as belonging to a not self-
financing category because of the lack of correspondence between utilization and payment of 
tariffs by users – reimbursed by the LHU on behalf of the patients (Amatucci, 2002). 
Through hospital activity development and a clear identification of its components, it has 
been possible to postulate the application of PF for hospital construction. On one hand, the 
fee is like a shadow toll, paid by the LHU for supporting services; on the other hand there are 
the prices paid by users for commercial services. This mechanism does not rule out placing 
the instrument of the public contribution side by side with the two mentioned above 
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(Amatucci and Biondi, 2002). In fact, the application of shadow tolls is commonly considered 
inappropriate because it implies such a low risk transfer as to put the project back on the 
public sector balance sheet (Yescombe, 2007:235). 
Another issue regards the structure of the fee. It consists of a fixed part corresponding to the 
equivalent amount in order to cover building availability; and a variable part, representing 
the equivalent sum in order to reimburse the services delivered by the SPV, according to 
volume and quality parameters (payment for usage, volume or demand). 
As a sector analysis by UTFP (2002) explained, greater attention is to be paid to the fixed 
component, which has a structure essentially correlated to the risk allocation according to the 
models of ‘availability payment’ and ‘capacity charge’. In the first case, the amount is a 
function of the bed occupancy rate. The availability services include everything from cleaning 
services, to the reception and clinical data information systems. This method contributes to 
the allocation of the commercial and operating risks between contractors and the LHU, using 
the bed occupancy rate as a reference parameter.  As an alternative, the ‘capacity charge’ 
model consists of a fixed amount that the LHU has to pay independently of the utilization 
level of the infrastructure. Usually, this amount is not comprehensive of the relative amount 
for the special maintenance of buildings, systems and equipment. The criterion, therefore, 
does not transfer the risk to the private contractor. Consequently, in the case of the 
‘availability payment’ method, the LHU makes a unitary payment, limited to the availability 
of areas and/or wards and to a given level of quality and efficiency of the services. According 
to this formulation, the contracts usually provide a proportional reduction  in the case of an 
interruption of services or a lower level of quality or efficiency, with a series of contractual 
penalties. On the contrary, postulating the “capacity charge” application, LHUs make a 
separate payment of the two fee components. The fixed one must always be paid, and its 
reduction occurs only in a few cases; while the variable component concerns the quality and 
efficiency parameters in a more generic way than the availability payment. 
 
TWO CASE STUDIES: A COMPARISON 
The research team has carried out the study starting from a definition of a legal framework 
and variants of the contractual formula, followed by an analysis of the conditions of 
applicability. Finally, it proceeded by the case study methodology, with reference to two 
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LHUs of the Veneto Region (Stake 1995; Yin, 2008). The study benefited from the 
collaboration of the Managers of the Technical Departments, responsible for the procedure. 
Several interviews were conducted with them during the construction of the case studies, also 
with the support of documentation regarding the different phases of the PPP implementation 
(business plan, agreement, make or buy simulations). In both cases, the managers gave their 
utmost in terms of commitment and effort for the implementation of the procedure; and their 
ability in planning the preliminary project, following the procedure, and steering the internal 
and external coordination must be duly acknowledged. 
In the course of the case studies, some different models of partnership emerged, which take 
into account various critical aspects and offer different solutions to legal, economic, social and 
environmental issues. In both cases, we reconstructed the PPP logic to explain the choice of 
the private financing in comparison with other financing formulas, by running the 
methodological framework again and analyzing the economic motivation, the influence of the 
critical aspects and their impact on management.  Effectively we have traced a comparison 
between the empirical evidence drawn from two different experiences: the first for the 
renovation and extension of two hospitals (Case X); the second for the construction of a new 
hospital (Case Y). In both cases, the hospitals are not autonomous entities but are dependent 
on LHUs in different local contexts of the same region. We gathered information during 2005-
6-7-8 with successive monitoring of the operation phase. To facilitate the comparison in this 
occasion, we used the criteria selected by the Resource Book on PPP Case Study of European 
Commission Directorate-General Regional Policy (June, 2004) with some additional information 
as follows (Schemes 1 and 2): 
- Value of Investment and financial structure– the capital investment of the project as a stand-
alone investment exclusive of the income stream or operational costs; 
- Contract Duration – the duration of the PPP contractual relationship with respect to the 
initial investment; 
- Transfer of Responsibility – the degree to which the private party is involved in the project 
defined by the contractual model and obligations, ownership of assets or operating rights 
and the project operational structure; 
- Demand Risk and Availability Risk as explained above; 
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Scheme 1 – Case X 
Case Study X 
Two Hospitals: completion of a hospital and construction of 
another one (in two different locations of the same territorial 
area under control of the LHU) 
Total Amount EUR 147.328.168 ( including VAT) 
Private Finance EUR 91.340.754 
Rationale/Objectives of the PPP 
(from the documents analysed) 
To increase efficiency; introduce new financial resources to 
complete the existing hospital, seize the opportunity to build a 
new hospital to meet an increasing demand 
PPP Actors LHU-Firm, Private Consortium (SPV) 
Financial Structure The investment is financed by public money (1/3) (LHU-Firm) 
and private (2/3)  
Contract Agreement between 
Parties 
DBFO and concession 
Risk Allocation The risk is principally borne by the private party, which is 
covering maintenance and operating costs. 
Institutional/Managerial Structure Healthcare services are managed by LHU and non-core 
services (12), such as parking, catering, facility management 
are managed by a private Special purpose vehicle with LHU 
oversight on quality service.  A particular tariff mechanism is 
in place to ensure equipment replacement. 
Tariff settings Availability payment with some reference to qualitative 
standards aimed to boost the quality in service  
Monthly fee 
51.94% for service management, 27.72% as payment for works 
carried out, 20.33% for plant and technological renewal 
Causes of tariff variations Execution of additional works 
Additional changes in services 
Service fees fixed in proportion to the actual management 
activities
Variations for the reduction in services (e.g. meals provided 
etc.) 
A decrease in service fees of more than 70% of the value 
outlined in the business plan  
Meals for in-patients: number of days patients stay in hospital 
Meals for fee-paying* patients: number of days spent  in 
hospital (* fee paid for single-room occupancy) 
Change in the tax system relating to activities and materials 
New  laws and regulations setting out new tariff mechanisms 
or new conditions for the activity 
Extraordinary and unexpected events, other than those 
mentioned above, if the pure cost of service management 
increases or decreases  by more than 5% 
Strong Points Transformation of the existing outsourcing of facility 
management (Global service) into PF with a low impact on the 
operational phase  
Weak Points Lack of a management culture in order to effectively assess the 
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investment convenience 
Rigidities dictated by excessive duration of the contract 
Increase of the investment for the presence of VAT, which 
represents a cost for the LHU 
There is no surrender clause 
There are only clauses of withdrawal for the SPV 
There are no provisions for reduction of the fee if the company 
proceeds to renegotiate the conditions of the loan at an interest 
rate lower than the original 
Excessive burden on the budget of the fee paid by the LHU 
Scheme 2 – Case Y 
 
Case Study Y 
 
A hospital in an area with high population density 
Total amount EUR 254.902.050 
Private finance EUR 120.163.197 
Rationale/Objectives of the PPP To find funds to build a new hospital according to the 
standards of national planning in healthcare, with respect to 
an old project that was never realized 
PPP Actors LHU-Firm, Private Consortium (SPV) 
Financial Structure The investment is financed by public money (1/2) (LHU-Firm) 
and private (1/2)  
Contract Agreement between 
Parties 
DBFO and concession 
Risk Allocation The risk is principally borne by the private operator which 
covers maintenance and operating costs but the security 
package is less detailed than in Case X 
Institutional/Managerial Structure Healthcare services are managed by LHU, non -healthcare 
services (22), such as parking, catering, facility management 
are managed by a private Special purpose vehicle with LHU 
oversight on quality service. There is a particular element 
with reference to the Radiology Ward and Analysis 
Laboratory whose administration, and not only maintenance, 
are attributed to the private contractor  
Tariff settings Availability payment with some reference to 
qualitative standards aimed to boost the quality in 
service 
 
Causes of tariff variations Meals for in-patients: number of days patients stay in hospital 
Meals for fee-paying* patients: number of days spent  in 
hospital (* fee paid for single-room occupancy) 
Change of the tax system about activities and materials 
Execution of additional works 
Laboratory service: number of tests 
Diagnostic service: number of tests 
Mandatory adjustment every four yearsgie r 
Strong Points Realization of infrastructure without making healthcare 
6th Annual EuroMed Conference of the EuroMed Academy of Business           1975 
 
Confronting Contemporary Business              ISBN: 978-9963-711-16-1 
Challenges  Through Management Innovation  
expenditure for investment worse. 
Outsourcing of facility management  
Weak Points Lack of a management culture in order to effectively assess 
the investment convenience 
Rigidities dictated by excessive duration of the contract 
Increase of the investment  because of VAT, which represents 
a cost for the LHU. 
There is no surrender clause 
There are only clauses of withdrawal for the SPV 
There are no provisions for reduction of the fee if the 
company proceeds to renegotiate the conditions of the loan at 
an interest rate inferior than the original 
Excessive burden on the budget of the fee  paid by the LHU 
Progressive emptying of internal capabilities and 
unsuccessful involvement of the medical personnel in the 
major decisions regarding the project (e.g. the lay-out) 
 
The comparison between the two procedures examined has made it possible to highlight the 
following characteristics:  
- in Case Y, the PF initiative represents a true point of reference at the national level 
because it constitutes one of the first experiences conducted in the healthcare sector; 
furthermore there has been continuity in the implementation, for the legal provisions of 
“urgency and necessity” and given that it is deeply rooted in a project dating back to the 
1990s. The concession started in 2002 and the PPP model is inspired by the first 
regulatory approach of the Italian law. Therefore, it may be considered as a pioneer 
experience in the Italian context;  
- in Case X, the solution of some critical aspects of the procedure has indirectly benefited 
from an evolving practice of PPP in healthcare, even though it has suffered from a series 
of events holding up the course of the procedure. The first factor to consider (an 
instability factor at the decision-making level) was the uncertainty about the general 
manager’s permanency in the same LHU. The choice to undertake a PPP coincided, in 
fact, with the end of his appointment, so it was necessary to wait for a new general 
manager. At the same time the change in legislation caused further interruptions due to 
differences in interpretation and practice. The concession started in 2004; 
- the two procedures started in a different manner. In Case X, the LHU did not need a 
request for proposal because the private party took full advantage of the opportunity 
offered by the change in the law in order to submit a proposal in relation to the 
requirements listed by the LHU in its three-year plan. Instead, in Case Y the request for 
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proposal to activate PF played a focus role by attracting proposals from promoters and 
launching a new procedure;  
- the object itself of the initiative may well be considered a focus element of distinction 
since it introduces some differences, influencing the procedure in terms of “time and 
costs”. In Case Y, the manager dealt with a project already discussed at the political level 
but with a strong socio-economic impact on the territory of reference, while in Case X it  
was the completion of an existing infrastructure and its impact was smaller than in Case 
Y. 
Despite the above-mentioned differences, the procedures have many elements in common, 
above all from the evaluation point of view, because at an institutional level, they were 
examined by the same advisors, the Regional Audit Office and the UTFP. So, both cases 
present an in-depth preliminary study, well-matched with the economic and financial model 
of the project, as intended in the first wave of Italian utilization of PPPs, in order to assure the 
maintenance of an adequate economic-financial equilibrium to the private contractor. From a 
financial standpoint, the initiative presents a different amount of investment.  
Although in mixed proportions, both initiatives have benefited from a public payment 
including the LHU’s own funds in Case Y. It means that in relation to the new financing 
mechanisms in force for LHUs, PPP in the healthcare sector may be implemented with the 
participation of the regional administrations in the financing. This raises a series of doubts 
and criticisms of the PPP utilization for the sole purpose of obtaining some of the missing 
resources, rather than through recourse to traditional forms of finance. Under the profile of 
the financial sustainability the business plan highlighted a provisional detailed articulation 
and a consistent economic return for private investors without a very substantial assumption 
of risk. As the accounting treatment imposes, this may constitute a severe problem in order to 
demonstrate the debt as off-balance sheet, above all in the light of several critics that have 
been descending on the intrepidy of the regional government that allowed the procedures. In 
general the LHUs dealt with a grid of financial ratios aiming to demonstrate the financial 
sustainability of the investments, their convenience, and the profitability for the private 
counterpart. A discouraging note derives from the fact that neither case presents the same 
perspective of internal procedure analysis, since in Case X a series of estimates and 
comparisons with the traditional procedure were made and are available. In Case Y, there 
was no validation test about the real VFM of the initiative. The same thing seems to occur in 
many cases of the UK experience also outside the hospital context (Kakabadse et al., 
2007).With reference to financial sustainability, in both cases, the debt service cover ratio 
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(DSCR) is positive, so it should ensure coverage of the loan repayment and guarantee the 
conditions for financial stability of the SPV. Under the conditions examined and tariffs 
charged, the results show that the two PPPs are too expensive. The hospitals remain the 
property of the SPV for the length of the contract and the remuneration obtained is superior 
to any other investment. Thus the private sector seems to be the only one to have 
convenience.  
From an accounting point of view, the assets do not appear in the budgets of the healthcare 
organizations, and the tariffs are treated as operating costs. Their incidence, therefore, has a 
double meaning. On the one hand, the costs weigh very heavily on the management of the 
LHUs and, consequently, of the regional group of reference, by eroding part of the funds 
allocated to healthcare; on the other hand, an evaluation according to the Eurostat statements 
would indicate that this kind of PPP has a negative effect on the public deficit. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
The real and tangible advantages of PPPs lie in the contribution of private capital for the 
realization of infrastructures that would not otherwise be possible, and a reduced incidence 
on public expenditure for investments. This should mean that initiatives may be considered 
somewhat off-balance sheet. Another key advantage is that a single approach gives multiple 
answers to the potential complexity of many outsourcing contracts whose risks are on the 
private partner. However, as highlighted in the two cases examined, the contractual formula 
should certainly be refined in order to mitigate those risks that in the PPP framework should 
be on the private sector.  
In the case of hospitals, if the construction risk is on LHUs or Regions (on which they 
depend), or if the private partner bears only the construction risk and no other risks, the 
assets are classified as public assets. This implies significant consequences for public finances, 
both for deficit and debt. The initial capital expenditure relating to the assets will be recorded 
as public fixed capital formation, with a negative impact on public deficit/surplus. Above all, 
the most relevant effect lies in the integration of forces aimed at the functioning of a public 
service. It is advisable to envisage two counterparts (public and private) only in the 
programming phase, when rules and roles are fixed, but, once the work is implemented, the 
strategy for a successful partnership consists of a coordinated combination of actions in a 
unitary perspective. Therefore, in national accounts the assets involved in a PPP can be 
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considered as non-government assets only if there is strong evidence that the partner is 
bearing most of the risk. What is mentioned above may lead to some repercussions on the 
utilization of PPP since effectiveness and efficiency in the long term may be affected by the 
private partner with an overestimation of costs in order to ensure a surplus in the PPP. Last 
but not least, it is possible to claim an effective contractual risk transfer by observing the 
contract performance when in use. This delegation of the operating process does not mean a 
loss of control on hospital functioning and service quality, for which  the LHUs (NHS) remain 
responsible. The message launched by these experiences emphasizes the concept of mutual 
exchange in the PPP regarding the lack of financial resources. It is crucial to know whether, in 
the long run, the results will meet expectations.  
In general, the hospitals observed in the case studies seem to take advantage of potentialities 
offered by this financing and operational mechanism since it represents the ideal tool for a 
realistic example of public-private integrated management.  
Several PPPs, already underway, present some elements of analysis from which to draw 
lessons for the future, given that the system is aiming to increase exemplary practices. As 
observed, what is problematic concerns the following factors: overcoming the merely 
opportunistic propensity to use the PPP, the use of ex ante test methodologies able to make 
realistic simulations on the future of the partnership, the flexibility to be given to contracts, so 
that risks shift to the private party but can also be adjusted when external variables require it. 
Of course, in the hospital case it is necessary for an ex ante evaluation to be able to count on 
reliable estimates concerning the use of hospitals and that the risk on the private party is not 
being excessively compensated by revenues that the private party itself would be prevented 
from reaching under normal market conditions. This is the paradox to be avoided. 
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